Abstract
Introduction
Recent advances in the ability to measure software robustness have revealed that it is common for software to be non-robust when presented with exceptional parameter values. For example, both Unix and Windows operating systems and their C libraries tend to have significant robustness failure rates, with C library functions often being less graceful at handling exceptions than system calls [81[151. Anecdotal data collected by robustness testing seems to suggest that systems incapable of gracefully handling exceptional conditions (including exceptions caused by software defects in application programs calling other software packages) tend to be somewhat less reliable at a system level, and much less reliable at the task level[ 151. While the evidence does not prove causality, in many cases overall system failures tended to be caused by modules with poor overall exception handing characteristics [ 15] [7] .
Despite a general need for better exception handling and the existence of tools to identify exception handling shortcomings, few projects pay anything other than passing attention to this aspect of the system. Some developers simply lack exposure to the need and methods for exception handling [ 121. Others eschew it because of perceived performance problems and development difficulty. Neither of these need be the case. As Maxion points out in [ 121, even a small amount of effort applied to raising the awareness of the importance of solid exception handling can result in significant improvements. Additionally, there are now several research and commercial tools to help developers detect potential robustness weaknesses [10] [6] [3] . But, beyond the issue of finding and correcting robustness problems, we believe that in general developers greatly overestimate the performance penalty of making software highly robust and use this as a reason to avoid robustness improvement.
An example of a software package developed with safety and robustness as a goal, without compromise to performance, is the safe, fast, VO library (SFIO) developed by David Kom and K.-Phong Vo at AT&T research [9] . The functions included in SFIO implement the functionality of the standard C I/O libraries found in STDIO. This library adds a large amount of error checking ability (as well as other functionality) to the standard IO libraries, and manages to do so without adversely affecting performance.
While the authors of SFIO were able to demonstrate that it was a high performance library, at the time it was developed there was no method for quantifying robustness. They could make a case that the library was safer due to their design decisions, but there was no method available to quantify how much they had improved over STDIO. Furthermore, discussions with the developers of SFIO revealed that even they were concemed about the performance impact of increasing the amount of exception checking done by their code. We saw the existence of SFIO as an opportunity to gain an initial understanding of how robust an Application Programing Interface (API) implementation might be made using good design techniques but no metrics for feedback, and what the actual performance penalty might be for fur-ther improving robustness beyond the point judged practical by SFIO developers. First, we used the Ballista tool to measure the robustness of SFIO to exceptional parameter values at the API level. This allowed us to quantify SFIO robustness and find that it was significantly more robust than STDIO, but still had room for improvement. Then we found some common types of robustness vulnerabilities in SFIO and hardened against them, further improving robustness. At first the improved SFIO did in fact have some performance problems; however, these were largely remedied by optimizing for the common case and the result proved to be significantly more robust than the original SFIO with only a slight performance penalty.
The remainder of this paper describes our efforts to identify and fix general robustness failures within the SFIO system and quantify the performance impact of the additional code added to harden the system against those failures. Additionally, we discuss the types of robustness failures that are still expensive to check for, and how near-term processor architecture enhancements for general purpose computing will also reduce the cost of improving robustness.
Robustness testing of SFIO
We used the Ballista testing suite to measure the robustness of the 36 functions in the SFIO API. This allowed us to objectively evaluate the SFIO library in terms of exception handling robustness. To test SFIO we used existing data types for POSIX tests and created two custom Ballista test types capable of generating tests cases for the SFIO types Sfio-t and Void-t. These types fit directly into the Ballista data type framework, and inherited much of their functionality from the generic pointer type. This made implementation a simple exercise, requiring only a few hours to implement the types, and to test the types themselves within the Ballista framework to ensure that they themselves were robust.
Our testing showed that while the robustness of SFIO is far greater than STDIO ( Figure I ), SFIO still suffers from a fair number of robustness failures in critical IO function such as write and read. Analysis of the testing data showed that there were three broad causes for many of the SFIO robustness failures. Specifically these were:
Failure to ensure a file was valid Failure to ensure file modes and permissions were appropriate to the intended operation These problems were not a case of defective checking code in the software itself, but rather a lack of attempting to check For these types of exceptions.
Once identified, these potential causes of failures were addressed in a generic fashion across the eight most important IC) functions in which they occurred: sfopen, sfwrite, sfread, sfclose, sffileno, sfseek, sfputc, and sfgetc (the "s" prefix indicates a "safe" version of the corresponding STDIO library call). For every function we were able to reuse the parameter validation code for each specific failure mode, thus reducing the cost of developing such checks to being linear with the number of parameter types, rather than %Abort Failures first version of what we will call Robust SFIO functions, only ordinary attention was paid to performance -the emphasis was instead placed on reducing robustness failure rates. Figure 2 shows that the percent of Abort failures (i.e., percent of test cases resulting in an abnormal task termination instead of an error code) were significantly reduced for the Robust SFIO software version.
While validating file parameters was fairly straightforward, validating the buffers and data structures was more difficult. Because the POSIX standard gives no assurance that a task's state will be valid after a memory access fault, we validated memory prior to the function execution by striding(read then write) through the memory structure with a stride size of the memory page size for the architecture the code was executed on. This allowed us to catch exceptions during a validation stage before modifying the system state, eliminating issues of performing rollbacks or otherwise dealing with partial completion of functions in the event of an exception.
We used the mechanisms described in [ l l ] to set up and perform signal handling on a per call basis. While this is more time Failure to check buffers and data structures for size and accessibility consuming than setting up global handlers, it does ensure that the exact state of the program at the time of the signal is known. This reduces the complexity of the signal handlers, and makes the recovery from such exceptions easier to design and code. Figure 2 shows the Abort failure rates for the 8 modified functions, both before and after treatment. While even the Robust SFIO library does not achieve perfect robustness failure prevention, it is significantly better than both STDIO and the original SFIO. Additionally, it is possible that Robust SFlO could be improved even further by employing techniques for detecting invalid memory structures (e.g., using techniques from [17] [1] [18] ). However, many of these techniques have a hefty performance penalty without their proposed architectural support to identify "bad data" situations. Thus, further robustness improvements will become practical only when they are supported by future generations of microprocessor hardware.
Performance Results
Once the evaluation of SFIO had been completed and several key functions had been hardened, we measured the performance of the original and hardened versions and compared them to each other, and to STDIO. T o measure the performance of the robust SFIO functions, we used the benchmarks (Table I ) as described by the authors of the original SFIO [9] . The results presented are the averages from I O benchmark runs and are presented in figure 3 (execution time variance across runs was minimal Linux is that some performance enhancements can't be included in the code base due to problems with cross platform compatibility. Further, it can be argued that Linux is most commonly used as a workstation OS and as such is optimized more for latency and less for raw throughput. Finally, commodity PC hardware is extremely cost sensitive and tends to sacrifice significant bandwidth potential to keep costs down. We hope that by satisfactorily showing that the cost of achieving a high degree of YO robustness is low on these diverse systems, it is likely that similar techniques will work on other systems whose design points fall between these two extremes. In order to avoid large penalties for exception context initialization and checking each time through a tight IO loop, we applied a variation of optimistic incremental specialization [ 131. We cached the most recent set of checks, and tested to see if the current data set was recently validated for a call that was non-destructive to its value. In such (1 case, we allowed program execution to bypass the exceptional condition checks. Table 2 gives complete user and system level performance data for the original SFIO and the final robust SFIO with incremental specialization . Total process time is broken clown into the user and system components as measured by libc function call time().
Analysis
It should be no surprise that the performance data clearly show that the common operations selected for additional hardening are IO bound. This is typical in a modem super-scalar machine where the CPU can be IO bound even on simple memory requests. Although there is much work being done to improve this [5] , it seems unlikely that the 1 0 speed will catch up to the speed of the processing unit in the near to mid-term future. Thus, hardening of IO functions can be accomplished basically for free on latency-based computational tasks.
In particular, although file I/O operations are state rich and require much error checking and handling, the latency added for increasing the ability of the functions to handle exceptions and behave in a robust manner is mostly hidden by the latency of the overall operations. Block file opera-
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File sizes 2x-8x larger for the axp (ALPHA) system [9] tions suffer an execution time penalty of only a few percent compared with the less robust implementations.
Though the elapsed time for the benchmarks to run to completion tell part of the story, it isn't enough to simply look at this data. Elapsed time hides the intricacies of what is going on inside the OS and hardware that can be critical to the performance of a system. After all, the time spent during IO wait can be used to perform other useful work in a multi-tasking system. Figure 4 shows the total time spent performing computation (i.e., usr+sys time but not IO wait time) of the hardened SFIO is in some cases less than that of STDIO, and except for the 757 block size and copy benchmarks is within 2% of STDIO on Linux. Both SFIO implementations used much less actual processing time than did STDIO on the Alphaserver platform (except seekrw, copyrw, revrd757 and read757) though the elapsed time tended to be close to or slower than STDIO. This seems to indicate that the Digital Unix STDIO libraries perform a fair amount of processing to optimize the disk transfers, and is bom out by the fact that the benchmarks spend less time in IO wait when using the STDIO libraries. From this one can infer that disk transfer scheduling optimizations consume far more CPU cycles than increased robustness checks.
The processing time penalty paid by robust SFIO compared to original SFIO consists largely of occasional exception handling context setup and parameter checks. In addition to this penalty, there is a mandatory penalty that represents the check to determine if the validation must be done. However, we expect the processing cost for such checks to diminish significantly in the near future.
Of the penalties incurred, the penalty for determining if validation should occur is likely to be almost completely negated by improved hardware branch prediction that will be available in new processors soon, though fragmenting block size with a branch can still affect performance[l6]. Actually achieving this requires creating a compiler that can structure exception-checking code sequences in a way that will help the CPU predict that exceptions will not occur.
Processors that use a trace cache[l6], such as the Intel Pentium 4 processor, will lessen the cost of additional checks by allowing the unit to fetch past branches that may otherwise throttle fetch bandwidth. While more advanced checking and caching techniques might degrade performance in ways the trace cache can not help (such as multi branch direction traces), we anticipate techniques to solve such problems will be incorporated in processors in the near future. These include such techniques as completion time multiple branch prediction [ 141 and block caches [2] . In general it seems reasonable to expect that exception checking branches, which are easily predictable as taking the non-exceptional code path, will become increasingly efficient as processors incorporate more predictive execution capabilities.
Thus, robust SFIO libraries can achieve dramatically reduced robustness vulnerabilities compared to STDIO and even original SFIO implementations. For latency-bound applications the performance impact of providing extra robustness is minimal. For throughput bound applications there can be a moderate increase in CPU time used to perform extra checking for some routines, but this can be minimized by caching check results. Furthermore, it is likely that as CPUs increase their use of concurrency and branch prediction that any speed penalties for performing exception checking will decrease dramatically over time. 
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Conclusions
We used the Ballista robustness testing tool to find robustness problems in the SafeEast I/O library (SFIO), and fou'nd that we were able to improve the robustness of the code by an average factor of 5.9 across the treated functions, despite the fact that SFIO already improves. robustness over STDIO robustness by an order of magnitude. The achieved robuslness level, was approximately 0% to 2% robustness failure rates, compared to 0% to 79% failure rates for STDIO. We have found that the remaining failures generally involve incorrect or corrupt data within otherwise valid data structures, but speculate that such failures might be dealt better with during interface design.
Contrary to commonly held opinion, very robust software need not come at the price of reduced performance. The data show that the performance penalty for providing thorough exception handling and error handling tends to be low in terms of elapsed time, and similarly small in terms of processing overhead. Robust SFIO was only -0%-15% (avg. of 2%) slower than ordinary SFIO, while providing better robustness. Furthermore, near-term architectural improvements in processors will tend to reduce the costs of providing robust exception handling by exploiting the fact that exception checks can be readily predicted and executed concurrently with mainstream computations.
